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Abstract 
 
Privatization is closely associated with the ideological turn to neoliberalism and 
regarded as a cornerstone of Britain’s “Thatcherite project”.  Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government did not undertake its major privatizations of state-owned 
businesses until its second term began in 1983. We argue in this paper, however, that 
the 1980 disposal by the National Enterprise Board of its controlling interest in the 
engineering and electronics company Ferranti offers significant insights into the 
development of privatization policy and practice, as well as the changing role of the 
state in British business.  This disposal reflected the early caution of some of the 
Thatcher government’s actions but contributed to fulfilment of an electoral 
commitment and provided valuable privatization experience in addressing difficult 
financial, industrial and political issues.   
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 2 
Introduction 
 
The state and business interact in many ways, whether through direct state ownership 
of business in some form of state capitalism or the impact of government policies in 
areas such as central planning, innovation, research and development, public 
procurement, public-private partnerships and outsourcing, competition, consumer 
protection and other regulation, and taxation.1    The neoliberal model emphasizes 
characteristics such as private property rights, the enforcement of contracts, market 
liberalization, free trade, individual liberty, low taxation and the role of entrepreneurs.  
In this model the state is expected to limit its role to providing and maintaining the 
institutional framework and conditions in which neoliberalism’s key elements – 
globalization, deregulation and financialization – can flourish.2 
 
Yet the state-business relationship is never permanently settled, adjusting to shifting 
economic and political circumstances and ideological perspectives.3  Privatization, or 
“the transfer of the ownership and control of enterprises from the State sector to the 
private sector”, is one of the most controversial and far-reaching issues in political 
economy in the last forty years, generating a huge and wide-ranging literature.4  It is 
central to the rise of neoliberalism as one of the defining policies in the “ideological 
turn” and a cornerstone of Britain’s “Thatcherite project”, which pioneered the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to provide a model for the 
                                                          
1 The vast literature on this subject includes, for example, the contributions to Coen, 
Grant and Wilson, Oxford Handbook; Hannah, “A Failed Experiment”; Kipping, 
“Business-Government Relations”; Lie, “Context and Contingency”; Middleton, 
Government Versus the Market; Millward: “State Enterprise in Britain”, “Business 
and the State” and “Business Institutions and the State”; Parker and Saal, 
International Handbook; and Shleifer, “State versus Private Ownership”. 
2 Harvey, Brief History, 64–66. 
3 As, for example, the alternative visions of industrial strategy in the Conservative and 
Labour parties’ 2017 UK election manifestos illustrate (Conservative Party, Forward 
Together; Labour Party, For the Many Not the Few). 
4 Quote from Lawson, View from No. 11, 199.  We acknowledge that a far wider 
definition is possible, as, for example, Harvey, Brief History, 160. 
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implementation of “Chicago School” free-market economic orthodoxy later dubbed 
“the Washington consensus”.5   
 
Britain’s privatization program began slowly and cautiously after the May 1979 
Conservative election victory, reflecting what some authors regard as a lack of 
coherence.6  We suggest this is only a partial explanation.  While an intellectual and 
political case for privatization had been made, the practicalities, tensions and 
contradictions inherent in policy implementation had not been resolved.  No template 
existed, with little prior history of privatization in Britain - by the late 1970s, no 
politicians in government or senior public officials had direct experience of the only 
previous privatization, the steel industry in the early-1950s.7  The ideological 
underpinnings therefore had to be tempered by practical considerations such as 
developing expertise within the machinery of government, securing the co-operation 
of managements and employees and wider political support, overcoming legislative 
obstacles and uncertainty about the appetite of financial markets for public sector 
assets, and addressing concerns over issues such as competition, foreign ownership 
and national security.8   
 
Many of the political debates and much of the academic literature on the relationship 
between the state and business in Britain involve arguments around “declinism”.  
These suggest variously that there was too much, too little, or the wrong kind of, state 
involvement in business.  The nature of these arguments has varied greatly depending 
on the period in which they have been made, the identity of their advocates, and the 
                                                          
5 Harvey, Brief History. 
6 For example, Kay and Thompson, “In Search of a Rationale”; Veljanovski, Selling 
the State, 7–8; Vickers and Yarrow, “Economic Perspectives”; Williamson, 
Conservative Economic Policymaking. 
7 Burk, First Privatisation.  We ignore here the then-Labour government’s 1978 sale 
of a minority holding in the oil company BP. This was essentially a one-off sale for 
financial expediency and did not involve the controversies of the Thatcher 
government’s privatizations.  
8 Parker, Formative Years, 161–164. 
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chosen measures of decline.9  While these arguments provide a backdrop for this 
paper, we neither seek to add to this literature, nor pronounce judgement on the 
success or otherwise of privatization as a policy. Similarly, we do not offer a wider 
assessment of Thatcherism.  Rather, we argue that privatization should be viewed 
from an eclectic perspective; frameworks such as neoliberalism, “declinism” and 
corporatism provide insights, but taken separately none offers a coherent view of how 
privatization actually developed in Britain.10 
 
Literature on privatization in Britain has concentrated on the sales of the large state-
owned corporations, which began in 1983 during the second term of Thatcher’s 
Conservative government.  This is understandable from economic and political 
standpoints as these disposals realized the bulk of privatization proceeds and aroused 
controversy over issues such as competition, sale prices, the impact of restructuring, 
and the spread of ownership.  However, this focus underplays an important part of the 
history of the neoliberal turn in the relationship between the state and business in 
Britain, those privatizations which took place during the first term of Thatcher’s 
premiership.  This paper uses one of these  to show how the political commitment to 
privatization was translated into reality. 
 
Disposals by the state holding company, the National Enterprise Board (NEB), other 
than its largest holdings in British Leyland (BL) and Rolls-Royce, have received 
relatively little attention.  We argue that the NEB’s 1980 sale of its controlling interest 
in the engineering and electronics company Ferranti offers significant insights into 
how privatization was translated from an ideological stance and policy commitment 
into practice.  Although the structure and mechanics of this disposal differed from 
those in most of the later and larger privatizations, the case came before Thatcher’s 
first government had accumulated significant privatization experience.  Ferranti’s 
                                                          
9 Tomlinson, “Thrice Denied”, comprehensively reviews and critiques this literature.  
Also see: Tomlinson, “Inventing ‘Decline”; Politics of Decline. See Edgerton, Rise 
and Fall of the British Nation, for a recent contribution to this literature. 
10 We therefore share the view of authors such as Williamson (Conservative 
Economic Policymaking) that a more nuanced understanding of Thatcherism and 
economic policy needs to be developed. 
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passage from family control to state control in the mid-1970s and its later 
privatization demonstrate the state’s changing role in British business, illustrating the 
reality of returning a single enterprise to the private sector.  Ideological factors played 
a part, but this privatization was shaped by the government’s interaction with a range 
of stakeholders, including company management, employees and their trade union 
representatives, the “Scottish lobby” (the company had extensive interests in 
Scotland), potential acquirers, and Ferranti’s most important customer, the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD).  This process forced the government to reconcile its neoliberal 
agenda with other priorities such as national security, and the need to maintain 
employment and innovative technical capacity.   
 
The involvement of some of Britain’s most controversial post-World War Two 
politicians adds a strong ideological dimension.  Labour’s Tony Benn, to some a 
visionary policymaker and modernizer and to others a dangerous socialist, was the 
architect of the NEB, “… a body which Tories regarded as the quintessence of 
corporatist folly”, according to one of Thatcher’s biographers.11  For Thatcher and Sir 
Keith Joseph, a key lieutenant who shared her political and intellectual outlook, the 
NEB’s control of Ferranti was a clear example of the kind of economic 
interventionism which affronted their principles – Ferranti’s strong recovery after 
flirtation with collapse removed any reason for continued state involvement. 
  
We base our analysis on secondary literature and a range of archival materials opened 
or deposited in recent years in Britain’s National Archives, principally Prime 
Ministerial records, and those of the Cabinet’s key privatization committee, the 
Department of Industry (DoI), and the MoD.12  We begin by reviewing the attitudes 
of Thatcher and her government to state ownership of business.  We then provide a 
brief history of the NEB, followed by a discussion of how Ferranti fell under its 
control.  In the following section we address the disposal of the NEB’s stake in 
Ferranti.  Finally, we relate the Ferranti case to the policy and practice of privatization 
more widely and draw some conclusions. 
                                                          
11 Young, One of Us, 363. 
12 While the NEB’s own records have not entered the National Archives and 
presumably do not survive, the extant records allow us to construct a clear account. 
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Thatcher, the Conservatives and Privatization 
 
In 1979, a range of major British industries and other businesses were in state 
ownership, mostly through nationalizations during the 1945-51 Labour government.13 
This range was broader than in some other Western European countries, where state 
ownership was limited to sectors such as posts, telecommunications, transportation 
and energy utilities.14 Although Hannah described state ownership as a “failed 
experiment”, Tomlinson contested this view as simplistic, seeing a variety of motives 
for state ownership consistent with Britain’s postwar political settlement: the 
opportunity to enhance productivity, human relations, and egalitarianism.15  The 
postwar Keynesian consensus in British politics was breaking down by the 1970s, 
under the pressures of oil crises, the end of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
arrangements, deindustrialization, popular discontent, labor militancy, and skepticism 
towards business.  Precision in dating this breakdown’s timing is difficult, but 
Conservative defeat in the February 1974 election was arguably key.  The 
Conservative Party’s neoliberal fringe had long interacted with like-minded 
businessmen and academics, often through think-tanks, and these connections 
intensified during the opposition years from 1974 to 1979, particularly after 
Thatcher’s election as party leader in 1975.16  The Labour Left, frustrated by their 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Millward and Singleton, Political Economy of Nationalisation. 
14 See, for example, Millward, “State Enterprise in Britain in the Twentieth Century”; 
Veljanovski, Selling the State, 50. 
15 Hannah, “A Failed Experiment”; Tomlinson, “A ‘Failed Experiment’?”. 
16 See, for example, Green, Ideologies of Conservatism; Rollings, “Cracks in the Post-
War Keynesian Settlement”.  Some historians argue that think-tanks such as the 
Institute of Economic Affairs and Centre for Policy Studies were important sources of 
radical ideas (Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable; Jackson, “Currents of Neo-
Liberalism”; James, “The Idea Brokers”; Stevens, “Evolution of Privatisation”). 
Others see greater continuity in Conservative policy-making and view think-tanks as a 
reflection of, rather than catalyst for, the spread of neoliberal ideas and the breakdown 
of the postwar consensus (Williamson, Conservative Economic Policymaking). 
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party’s inability to shape the economy during 11 years of government (1964-70 and 
1974-1979), were impatient for more radical policies to replace what they viewed as a 
failed consensus.17  Disillusionment with state planning in Britain, arguably arising in 
part from overreach by both major political parties, contributed to the breakdown.18 
 
Historians generally accept that Thatcher intended to replace “the mixed economy 
with a private-sector market economy”.19  Her personal commitment to reducing the 
size of the public sector was undoubted, for her an economic, political and moral 
imperative, expressed before and after serving as Prime Minister.  Her foreword to her 
party’s 1979 election manifesto argued that: “The balance of society has been 
increasingly tilted in favour of the State at the expense of individual freedom.  This 
election may be the last chance we have to reverse that process”.20  Her memoir 
asserted that privatization was “one of the central means of reversing the corrosive 
and corrupting effects of socialism … fundamental to improving Britain’s economic 
performance … at the centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom”.21 
 
Many of Thatcher’s party colleagues shared her views, disappointed by the failure to 
reverse state ownership during Edward Heath’s 1970-74 Conservative government.22  
A 1977 policy statement advocated policies more friendly to enterprise, supported 
wider home ownership and “direct encouragement to schemes which place assets in 
the hands of a much wider section of working people”, and endorsed privatization.23  
John Moore, a Treasury minister from 1983 to 1986 heavily involved in the 
privatization program, subsequently articulated Conservative sentiments: “Our 
objective is to promote competition and inspire efficiency … Privatisation hands 
back, to the people of this country, [nationalized] industries that have no place in the 
public sector”; privatization was a mechanism “for transforming a command economy 
                                                          
17 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party. 
18 O’Hara, From Dreams to Disillusionment. 
19 Green, Ideologies of Conservatism, 216; Smith, “From Consensus to Conflict”, 64. 
20 Dale, Conservative Party Manifestos, 265. 
21 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 676. 
22 Green, Thatcher, 90–97. 
23 Howe, Joseph, Prior, and Howell, Right Approach, 42–43, 47, quote from 34. 
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into a free one” to deliver the benefits of free markets and individual ownership.24  
Thatcher, however, told the Sun newspaper in 1978 that: “I am not going to go 
rushing into mass denationalization” and did not use the term “privatization” in public 
until July 1981.25  
 
The financial performance of SOEs added to the political arguments for privatization, 
with some incurring significant losses and therefore adding to public expenditure 
pressures. The evidence on their performance is mixed: growth in output, employment 
and productivity varied considerably across nationalized industries, with some 
performing better than wider manufacturing industry and others worse. Overall, 
though, profitability of the public corporations, particularly in the 1970s, was much 
lower than that of industrial and commercial companies, an outcome often attributed 
to a lack of clarity in, or inherent conflicts between, the objectives of SOEs.26 
 
 
The National Enterprise Board 
 
The NEB emerged in 1975, a product of arguments about British decline and 
Labour’s internal battles as politicians on the left sought greater control over business 
                                                          
24 Moore, Why Privatise?, 15; Privatisation Everywhere, 36. 
25 Green, Thatcher, 83, 98.  Thatcher disliked the “ugly word” privatization and 
refused to use it (Lawson, View from No. 11, 198), although the term featured in 
private government discussions, for example, The National Archives (hereafter 
“TNA”), CAB134/4339, October 4, 1979 E(DL) (79) 6th meeting.  Friedman (From 
Galbraith to Economic Freedom, 51–52) used the term earlier in arguing that 
ownership of all Britain’s SOEs should pass to a mutual fund in which all citizens 
would hold a share. 
26 Hannah, “A Failed Experiment”, 93–94; Middleton, Government Versus the 
Market; 610–614; Parker, Formative Years, 12–18; Tomlinson, Government and the 
Enterprise, 211–212, 214. 
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to address the perceived problem of underinvestment.27  The idea of a state holding 
company appeared in 1969 Labour Party documents, and a 1973 party Green Paper 
commited “the NEB … to be the basis for control across the economy through public 
ownership of 25 of the top 100 companies”, which would be nationalized to “promote 
investment, employment and industrial democracy” in support of a wider Alternative 
Economic Strategy.28 The planned NEB had a broader scope than the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation (IRC), a government-sponsored and -funded body 
established by the Labour government in 1966 and abolished by the Conservative 
government in 1971. Modeled on Italy’s IRI, its purpose was to promote industrial 
reorganization and rationalization schemes in “the national interest”, such as the 
creation through merger of BL.29  The IRC and the NEB updated earlier Labour 
thinking – the party had proposed “a National Investment Bank, to plan investment 
and industrial development” as early as 1934.30 
 
Labour returned to government in early 1974, but Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
disagreed with the Green Paper proposals, which ultimately led to an emasculated 
NEB and isolation of Benn, its chief political sponsor.31  Benn, as Secretary of State 
for Industry, presented diluted plans for the NEB.32  The party’s October 1974 
election manifesto supported these proposals, including the objective  “… to extend 
public ownership into profitable manufacturing industry by acquisitions, partly or 
wholly, of individual firms”.33  Benn’s final proposals in February 1975 would have 
forced pension funds and insurance companies to channel funds to the NEB, but 
                                                          
27 Mottershead, “Industrial Policy”; Sawyer, “Industrial Policy”; and Tomlinson, 
Government and the Enterprise, 276–307; and Artis, Cobham, and Wickham-Jones, 
“Social Democracy in Hard Times”. 
28 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party, quotes from 127 and 
63–64 respectively. 
29 Hague and Wilkinson, IRC; O’Hara, “What the Electorate Can be Expected to 
Swallow”, 511–516; Pass, “Industrial Reorganisation Corporation”. 
30 Thorpe, British Labour Party, 83. 
31 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party, 143–147. 
32 Regeneration of British Industry. 
33 Labour Party, Manifesto, October 1974, 9–10. 
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Wilson switched him to another role and the November 1975 Industry Act created a 
NEB with “limited funds and autonomy”.34 It still had wide-ranging aims and 
activities, with “… the principal objective of promoting efficiency and international 
competitiveness in British industry …”, when directed by government and on its own 
initiative, including the provision of finance and help in restructuring industry sectors, 
and with “… special consideration to areas of high unemployment …”.35 
 
Labour’s center-right stubbornly resisted Benn’s more radical proposals for several 
reasons, notably the electorate’s perceived antipathy to plans for nationalization and 
greater state intervention in the economy, given the political unpopularity of the 
nationalized industries which stemmed in part from their questionable performance.36  
At a time when the economy was struggling they also feared damage to relations with 
business, which bitterly opposed the plans for the expansion of state ownership and 
planning agreements.37   
 
The NEB’s explicit focus on manufacturing businesses contrasted with many of 
Britain’s other SOEs. Its initial portfolio comprised the government’s existing equity 
stakes in seven industrial companies, including Ferranti, which were transferred in 
February 1976.38  By 1979, its interests extended across several sectors: aircraft 
                                                          
34 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party, 138–140, quote from 
140. 
35 Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions, Evidence, Vol. 1, 
23.  The 2017 Labour election manifesto illustrates the recycling of political and 
economic ideas, promising “to establish a ‘National Investment Bank’ that will bring 
in private capital finance … to support a network of regional development banks” and 
provide finance for small firms and long-term “R&D-intensive” investment, and 
support a broader industrial strategy (Labour Party, For the Many Not the Few, 16). 
36 O’Hara, “What the Electorate Can be Expected to Swallow”. 
37 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party, 126. 
38 NEB, Annual Report, 1976, 7.  Employee numbers were significant: BL with 
192,000; Rolls-Royce, 62,000; International Computers Limited (ICL), 24,000; 
Ferranti, approximately 17,000; and Alfred Herbert, 6,700 (Kramer, State Capital and 
Private Enterprise, 194). 
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engines, computers, machine tools, motorcycles, cars, trucks, construction equipment, 
and electronics. These investments fell into three broad categories: companies in long-
term or terminal decline, such as the loss-making vehicle giant BL which dominated 
the portfolio in financial terms, and the machine tool manufacturer Alfred Herbert; 
those with significant short-term problems but better long-term prospects, for example 
Ferranti and aero-engine and power plant manufacturer Rolls-Royce; and venture 
capital-style investments, notably in the computer industry, including semi-conductor 
manufacture.39  The first two categories were not necessarily easy to distinguish ex-
ante, falling under the NEB’s “hospital role”, or what the later Conservative Industry 
Minister Norman Tebbitt referred to as “that lame-duck farm”.40   
 
The concept of the “Macmillan gap”, with banks and equity investors unwilling to 
finance small and medium-sized enterprises, new and innovative businesses, and 
research and development, has been recognized since the 1930s.41  Although 
institutions had been developed to address this problem, the NEB’s venture capital 
role reflected the view of some, not confined to the Labour Left, that this gap 
remained.42  This critique is linked to the characterization of Britain’s system of 
corporate governance as an “outsider” one, in which wealth-maximizing institutional 
shareholders dominate, and sometimes pursue or support short-termist takeovers, 
concerns which influenced the NEB’s disposal of its Ferranti stake.43   
 
Overall, the NEB did not fulfil its intended purpose: “far from becoming the promoter 
of structural change in profitable areas of the economy, [it] came to focus on propping 
                                                          
39 Campbell-Kelly and Hamilton (“From National Champions to Little Ventures”) 
assess the NEB’s information technology investments. 
40 TNA, PREM19/260, Joseph memorandum to Thatcher on “NEB: Future Role and 
Functions”, July 6, 1979; Tebbitt, Upwardly Mobile, 177. 
41 Baker and Collins. “English Commercial Banks”; Thomas, Finance of British 
Industry, 116–121. 
42 Coopey and Clarke, 3i; Scott and Newton, “Jealous Monopolists”; Toms, Wilson 
and Wright, “Evolution of Private Equity”, 742–744. 
43 On “short-termism” more generally, see, for example, Kay, Kay Review, and 
Mayer, “The City and Corporate Performance”. 
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up … firms in financial trouble, something it had been devised explicitly not to do … 
In all 95% of its funds went on lame ducks”.44  Arguably, however, assessments of 
the NEB’s performance should reflect that it was never envisaged to operate in 
macroeconomic circumstances as difficult as those of the 1970s.45 Its changing 
leadership was another factor in its performance. Its first chairman, Lord Ryder, was 
regarded as autocratic and unwilling to engage in debate, while the Labour 
government, focused on increasingly difficult macroeconomic and industrial relations 
issues, progressively marginalized his successor, Sir Leslie Murphy.46 
 
The 1979 Labour election manifesto promised to expand the NEB’s role, but made no 
specific commitments.47  In contrast, the Conservatives’ manifesto committed “to 
reduce government intervention in industry, particularly that of the [NEB]”, and to 
“restrict [its] powers … solely to the administration of the Government’s temporary 
shareholdings, to be sold off as circumstances permit”.48  The NEB’s directors 
opposed such disposals, resigning en masse in November 1979 after the Conservative 
government’s decision to transfer supervision of Rolls-Royce to the DoI.49  The 
NEB’s new chairman Sir Arthur Knight acknowledged its changed role, and its major 
inherited shareholdings were disposed of in various ways as “The Conservatives 
purged the NEB of what they took to be its most undesirable features”.50  The largest 
holdings, Rolls-Royce and BL, were transferred to the DoI’s direct control in August 
1980 and March 1981 respectively.51  In 1981, the NEB and the National Research 
                                                          
44 Wickham-Jones, Economic Strategy and the Labour Party, 141. The NEB received 
£777 million, of which BL absorbed £569 million. 
45 Artis, Cobham, and Wickham-Jones, “Social Democracy in Hard Times”, 44–45, 
57; O’Hara makes a similar point, arguing that price controls imposed on some SOEs 
undermined their financial performance (“What the Electorate Can be Expected to 
Swallow”, 519). 
46 “Sir Leslie Murphy: Obituary”, Guardian, October 10, 2007. 
47 Labour Party, Manifesto 1979, 10 
48 Dale, Conservative Party Manifestos, 267, 269. 
49 Parker, Formative Years, 58. 
50 NEB, Annual Report, 1979, 3; quote from Redwood, Going for Broke, 72. 
51 NEB, Annual Report, 1980, 3. 
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Development Corporation (NRDC) were merged “under the flag of the British 
Technology Group”.52 
 
 
“The Ferranti spirit” and government control 
 
Ferranti was a large and long-established British electrical engineering and defense 
electronics business.53  In 1974 the Ferranti family held 56 percent of the equity and 
the founder’s grandsons, the brothers Sebastian and Basil de Ferranti, were managing 
director/executive chairman and deputy managing director.54 The family resisted 
moves to formalize financial management structures, which they argued would inhibit 
the company’s durable, distinctive, but controversial, management tradition known as 
“the Ferranti spirit”.55   This emphasized innovation and engineering excellence in a 
decentralized group structure, an environment that attracted highly-qualified 
engineers.56 Harold Wilson, however, thought that “the brilliant Ferranti brothers 
were regarded as too theoretical and not profit-minded enough”. One might also argue 
that “the Ferranti spirit” reflected Alfred Chandler’s contested version of declinism, 
“the continuing commitment to personal capitalism in British industry”, although the 
family business literature is generally more nuanced and positive than Chandler on the 
potential benefits of family control.57 
                                                          
52 Ibid., 1981, 3.  The NRDC was formed in 1948 to commercialize publicly-funded 
research.  The British Technology Group’s “last remnant” was sold in a management 
buyout in March 1992 (Parker, Popular Capitalism, 33). It is now listed on the 
London Stock Exchange as the medical technology company BTG plc with a market 
capitalization of £2.5 billion. 
53 See Wilson, Building a Family Business; From Family Firm to Multinational; 
Managers, Mergers and Fraud. 
54 Wilson, From Family Firm to Multinational, 380. 
55 Ibid., 1; Wilson, “Ferranti and the Accountant”; interviews with Sebastian de 
Ferranti. 
56 Wilson, Building a Family Business, xv; interview with Sebastian de Ferranti. 
57 Quotes from Wilson, Final Term, 136, and Chandler, Scale and Scope, 239.  See 
the recent discussion in Bower, “The Whitbread Umbrella”, 877–880. 
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The “Ferranti spirit” was undoubtedly responsible for stimulating a wide range of 
innovations in multiple areas of electronic engineering, from meters to avionics and 
micro-electronics.58 However, the lack of rigorous financial controls and loose 
management structures contributed to a severe liquidity crisis in the early 1970s. 
Crucially, Sebastian de Ferranti refused to take decisive action to limit the mounting 
losses associated with power transformers and micro-electronics, resulting in 
extensive calls on the company’s borrowing facilities with its main banker, National 
Westminster. These internal problems were exacerbated by the deep macroeconomic 
problems of the era, leading National Westminster to refuse to sanction increased 
borrowing.59  The Bank of England provided the first hint that Ferranti would seek 
government support on August 14, 1974.60  Discussions involving Ferranti, National 
Westminster, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM) as reporting accountants, the 
Treasury and the DoI continued through the remainder of 1974.  The Treasury was 
concerned about Ferranti’s role as a major employer, but also about the lack of clarity 
on the government’s potential financial commitment, an issue on which PMM could 
offer little reassurance.61  The DoI worried about the “prestige of this company”, a 
major exporter, and defense contractor, with 35 percent of its 1973 sales going to the 
MoD.62  The Ferranti brothers were also tempted into preliminary discussions with 
GEC’s managing director Arnold Weinstock over a possible partial or full takeover, 
and, apparently concerned at the potential price for government support, deferred 
approaching the government until National Westminster exerted extreme pressure.63 
 
Benn saw the irony of the Conservative-supporting Ferranti brothers seeking a “bail-
out” from the Labour government and resisted their attempts to retain control and 
                                                          
58 Wilson, From Family Firm to Multinational, 2–32. 
59Ibid., 30. 
60 TNA, T233/2901, G.S. [Gordon] Downey note to Mr [William] Ryrie. 
61 Ibid., Ryrie note to Leo Pliatzky and Private Secretary to the Chief Secretary, 
September 6, 1974.   
62 Ibid., P.W. [later Sir Peter] Carey draft paper to Secretary of State [Benn], 
September 5, 1974. 
63 Ibid., Ryrie note to Pliatzky, September 13, 1974. 
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secure generous personal contracts.64  He was influenced by a September 17, 1974 
visit from “a huge delegation representing Ferranti workers from all over the UK”, 
who wanted government support to preserve the group’s current form and avoid job 
losses or takeover.65  The government took 50 percent of the voting shares and 62.5 
percent of the total equity in Ferranti plus loan stock in exchange for a £15-million 
cash investment and an £11-million guarantee of bank borrowings.66  The Ferranti 
brothers moved into non-executive roles, other non-executive directors were 
appointed, and the family shareholdings were diluted to just under 20 percent of the 
voting shares.  The new managing director was an outsider, Derek Alun-Jones, 
formerly at the oil company Burmah.67 
 
Ferranti’s turnaround involved consolidation of its financial position, debt reduction 
and asset sales, restructuring of the business, introduction of stronger accounting and 
financial controls, retention of “the Ferranti spirit”, and an emphasis on expanding its 
US business, all with the ultimate aim of escape from government control.68  The 
NEB’s first annual report flagged a rapid recovery.69  In 1977, the company raised an 
£18-million syndicated loan to repay the loan stock and reduce its debt to National 
Westminster, and the 1979 £7-million sale of its loss-making Canadian subsidiary 
further improved its finances.70 
 
State control saved Ferranti from financial distress and protected it from takeover or 
break-up.  Whether this would have occured under a Conservative government is 
unclear, and opinions vary according to political persuasion as to whether Ferranti 
would have survived without government help.71  Although the conservative 
                                                          
64 Benn, Against the Tide, 225, 358, 374. 
65 Ibid., 226. 
66 Wilson, From Family Firm to Multinational, 425. 
67 Ibid., 45–57.  
68 Ibid., 335–365.  
69 NEB, Annual Report, 1976, 14. 
70 Ibid., 1977, 15; Wilson, From Family Firm to Multinational, 336, 347–348. 
71 Redwood, Going for Broke, 142; Wilson, Final Term, 150; Wilson, From Family 
Firm to Multinational, 351–353.   
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newspaper the Daily Mail recognized Ferranti as the “NEB’s biggest success story”, 
the roles of the NEB and the government in the company’s recovery are also 
debated.72  The importance of management change was widely acknowledged, but 
Alun-Jones had been appointed before the transfer of the government’s stake to the 
NEB, and some argued that the NEB contributed little.73  Ferranti and Fairey 
Engineering, another NEB investment, arguably benefited from government custom 
as defense suppliers, but the NEB was supportive of Ferranti’s new leadership, 
trusting Alun-Jones and his team to effect a recovery.74 
 
 
Disposal of the NEB’s interest in Ferranti 
 
Under the terms of the agreement for government assistance, the NEB reduced its 
shareholding in Ferranti to 50 percent when the company’s recovery allowed it to be 
floated on the London Stock Exchange in September 1978.  This sale realized a 
£960,000 profit and the NEB’s remaining holding at December 31, 1978 was valued 
at £38.9 million against a cost of £6.9 million.75  The NEB began to dispose of its 
legacy holdings after the 1979 Conservative election victory. It sold its minority stake 
in ICL for £37 million for a profit of £24 million and received an offer of £19.5 
million for its holding in Fairey.76  Ferranti, “the jewel of the NEB’s rather tarnished 
crown”, was next: “… the NEB and the company are considering ways in which the 
future of Ferranti can best be secured.  In reaching any decision, the NEB will take 
account of the interests of the company and the taxpayer”.77 
                                                          
72 Daily Mail, February 7, 1978, quoted by Kramer, State Capital and Private 
Enterprise, 182. 
73 Kramer, State Capital and Private Enterprise; Grylls and Redwood, Case for 
Euthanasia, 31–34. 
74 Hannah, “A Failed Experiment”, 101; Wilson, From Family Firm to Multinational, 
435–458. 
75 NEB, Annual Report, 1978, 20. 
76 Ibid., 1979, 4. 
77 The Times, “Ferranti Fights for its Independence”, June 18, 1980; NEB, Annual 
Report, 1979, 12. 
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Disposal options were numerous: public offering of the shares; sale to institutional 
investors; management buy-out; sale to a single bidder, most likely a British or 
international industrial rival; break-up of the Ferranti group, whose spread of 
businesses effectively made it a mini-conglomerate; or some combination of these 
approaches.78  In August 1980, all but two percent of the NEB’s remaining 50 percent 
stake in Ferranti was widely distributed in “a placing with more than one hundred 
institutional shareholders”, accompanied by an issue of new shares which raised 
nearly £21 million and left Ferranti virtually debt-free.79 The NEB’s proceeds 
amounted to £54 million, although “the Government’s policy that the shares of 
Ferranti should be placed with restrictions on resale resulted in the disposal being on 
less favourable terms than could have been obtained on the open market”.80 The cash 
inflow benefited the public finances, although the loss on the liquidation of Alfred 
Herbert, another inherited holding, almost exactly offset the NEB’s profit on the 
disposal (£47.27 million).81   
 
The Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy: Sub-Committee on Disposal of 
Public Sector Assets (hereafter “the Sub-Committee”) was central to the Ferranti 
disposal. It first met on June 5, 1979, just over one month after the May 3, 1979 
election.  A memorandum from Nigel Lawson, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
documented his discussions with the NEB over the disposal of its stakes in Ferranti 
and ICL.82  In another memorandum, Lawson noted the “need to treat each of the 
NEB sales on its merits”, and that offers to the public “may not lead to the best price 
or offer the best solution in industrial terms or for introducing better commercial 
                                                          
78 Other early privatizations reflect this range of disposal options.  For example the 
National Freight Corporation was sold to management and employees in February 
1982 and International Aeradio, a subsidiary of British Airways, was sold to the 
British company Standard Telephone and Cables in March 1983. 
79 Ferranti, Annual Report, 1981, 7. 
80 NEB, Annual Report, 1980, 3. 
81 Ibid., 29. 
82 TNA, CAB 134/4339, memorandum E(DL) (79) 2, June 4, 1979, “Disposal of 
Public Sector Trading Assets”, Appendix B. 
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discipline into management. … In some cases we could do better to agree to a sale to 
another company; for example, I understand that a good deal of interest has already 
been shown by other companies in Ferranti”.83  The Sub-Committee’s second meeting 
discussed this memorandum and possible measures to encourage employee 
participation in share sales such as the establishment of trusts to lend money to 
employees to help them participate, and the need to give preference to “small 
applicants”.84 
 
The disposal process culminated in mid-1980 after a year during which disposal 
options were explored, potential bidders and the attitudes of interested government 
departments identified, and representations made by Ferranti, potential bidders, and 
others.  Prime responsibility for dealing with the NEB lay with Sir Keith Joseph, 
Secretary of State for Industry and his junior Industry Minister, Adam Butler.85  
Scottish Labour House of Commons member Gavin Strang wrote to Joseph only four 
days after the election, and Ferranti directors were in touch soon after.86  Alun-Jones 
and Sebastian de Ferranti met Butler, requesting an outcome which would secure the 
company’s independence.87  Alun-Jones suggested a gradual sale of the NEB’s stake 
to reduce the risk of takeover, possibly in two tranches, a solution also advocated by a 
stockbroker specializing in the engineering and electronics sectors.88   
 
                                                          
83 Ibid., memorandum E(DL) (79) 3, June 18, 1979, “Disposal of BP Shares and NEB 
Holdings”. 
84 Ibid., minutes, June 20, 1979. 
85 Joseph was interested in SOEs from at least 1956 when he joined the Conservative 
Party’s newly-formed Policy Committee on the Nationalised Industries (Green, 
Thatcher, 86). 
86 TNA, FV94/217, letters to Joseph from: Strang, May 7, 1979; Ferranti director, 
John Pickin, May 15, 1979; Sebastian de Ferranti, May 24, 1979. 
87 Ibid., note of meeting, July 23, 1979. 
88 Ibid., note of meeting between Butler and Angus Irvine of Savory Milln, January 
25, 1980. 
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In June 1980 Butler made the case for sale to the highest bidder, but acknowledged 
that: “Whatever decision is made the Government is likely to be criticised!”89  His 
position aligned with Lawson’s, and reflected advice from the merchant bank advising 
the government and the NEB, Rothschilds, who favored sale to “a larger industrial 
group”. This solution alarmed Ferranti’s board, which unanimously preferred an 
option offering independence, although Alun-Jones feared that wide dispersal of the 
NEB’s stake would further empower the Ferranti brothers who were reasserting 
themselves.90 
 
Several potential bidders for all or part of the NEB’s stake had identified themselves: 
the British companies BICC, GEC, Hawker Siddeley, Northern Engineering 
Industries, Racal and Vickers; the British subsidiary of the US Sperry Corporation; 
and the French company Matra.91 GEC was persistent but recognized that its market 
position and significance as a supplier to the MoD complicated its potential 
acquisition of part or all of Ferranti.  Weinstock lamented the loss of the opportunity 
to create a “national champion” in electronics, comparing the British government’s 
position unfavorably to its counterparts in West Germany, France and elsewhere.92  
His deputy suggested that a minority GEC stake in Ferranti and exchange of directors 
                                                          
89 TNA, CAB 134/4339, memorandum E(DL) (80) 8, June 13, 1980, “Ferranti: 
Disposal of NEB Shareholding”. 
90 Ferranti board minute 10763, May 29, 1980; TNA, FV94/218, note by P.G. 
Moulson, Private Secretary to Carey, on a series of ad-hoc meetings and telephone 
calls involving Carey, the Ferranti brothers and Alun-Jones on June 2, 1980.  Knight 
advised Carey that some potential institutional investors wanted Sebastian de Ferranti 
to step down (FV94/219, note by Moulson, June 17, 1980). 
91 TNA, FV94/217, memorandum from A.J. Lippitt, Deputy Secretary, DoI to A.H. 
Lovell, Treasury, February 15, 1980; FV94/218, letter from Sir Alan Dawtry, Sperry 
Limited, to Knight, May 29, 1980. Further potential British bidders had withdrawn or 
not responded: Plessey, Smiths Industries, Thomas Tilling and Thorn (FV94/219, note 
of meeting between Butler and Ian Halliday, NEB Chief Executive, June 17, 1980). 
92 TNA, FV94/217, letter from Weinstock to Joseph, February 18, 1980; note by 
I.K.C. Ellison, Joseph’s Private Secretary, of Weinstock’s visit to Joseph on February 
19, 1980. 
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would be more acceptable than acquisition of the NEB’s shareholding or a full bid.93  
Racal, with less overlap with Ferranti and so more likely to retain its Scottish plants, 
appears to have been the government’s and Ferranti’s favored British bidder, but it did 
not pursue its interest.94  The MoD opposed sale to any foreign company for several 
reasons: “… in a number of areas … there is no adequate alternative capability in the 
UK”; potential limits to access to technologies arising from foreign ownership; and 
Ferranti’s value as “… a source of innovation in ideas … in areas of technology yet to 
be explored …”.95  The MoD, however, viewed the German company Siemens 
positively, and the DoI showed particular antipathy to potential French buyers due to 
“the obstructive attitude of the French authorities to British investment in France”.96 
 
Thatcher initially supported the Butler-Lawson approach, telling the House of 
Commons with characteristic directness: “The NEB and the previous Labour 
Government assisted Ferranti during a very difficult period.  Ferranti no longer needs 
that assistance.  The NEB wishes to sell the shares and to obtain the best possible 
price.  It must be free to do that”.97  Lobbying against this position was direct and 
indirect, in public and private.  The Times newspaper published letters from Ferranti 
directors and senior managers pleading for a solution which secured its 
                                                          
93 TNA, FV94/219, letter from Kenneth Bond, GEC, to Halliday, June 5, 1980, 
follow-up telephone call from Weinstock to Carey, June 17, 1980. 
94 TNA, FV94/217, letter from Kenneth Macdonald, MoD, to Jack Leeming, DoI, 
August 1, 1979; FV94/219, brief from J.A. Battersby to Butler, June 23, 1980; note of 
meeting between Carey and Racal’s Ernest Harrison and Sir Robert Clark, June 23, 
1980. 
95 TNA, FV94/217, letter from Macdonald to Leeming, August 1, 1979; FV94/218, 
letter from G.H. Green, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Procurement Executive, 
MoD, to A.G. Manzie, DoI, June 6, 1980. 
96 TNA, FV94/217, letter from Green to Lippitt, February 21, 1980; FV94/218, 
Moulson note, June 3, 1980. 
97 Hansard House of Commons, June 10, 1980, col. 300. 
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independence.98  Ferranti’s directors met Butler to argue their case.99  Basil de 
Ferranti went direct to John Hoskyns, head of the Downing Street Policy Unit from 
1979 to 1982, to reinforce their arguments.100  He also wrote to Thatcher, who assured 
him that a decision would be taken only “after the most careful consideration”.101  
Director Donald McCallum wrote to Joseph, with copies to several Cabinet ministers, 
to advocate “wide placing of the NEB’s shareholding”.102  Alun-Jones asked James 
Prior, Secretary of State for Employment, to support Ferranti’s independence and 
highlighted the role of employee co-operation in its turnaround.103 Thatcher politely 
declined to receive a delegation led by the Mayor of Oldham, a town with many 
Ferranti employees.104   
 
Opposition to the disposal from Labour members of parliament, who wanted the NEB 
to retain its stake, was expected, but thirteen “doubtful” Conservatives were also 
identified.105  During a House of Commons debate on Ferranti several of these urged 
caution, and various Conservative and Labour members referred to letters received 
from Alun-Jones and constituents who were employees, as well as their meetings with 
                                                          
98 The Times, letter from Albert Dodd and Pickin, “NEB’s Holding in Ferranti: A 
Question of Disposal”, May 29, 1980; letter from Sebastian de Ferranti, “Disposal of 
State’s Ferranti Holding”, June 18, 1980. 
99 TNA, FV94/218, meeting note, June 10, 1980; CAB 134/4448, memorandum 
E(DL) (80) 8, June 13, 1980, “Ferranti: Disposal of NEB Shareholding”; The Times, 
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100 TNA, PREM19/260, Hoskyns letter to Joseph, May 30, 1980; Parker, Formative 
Years, 162.  Hoskyns had been a successful businessman without formal party 
political affiliation but was commited to a market-oriented economic approach 
(Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 259–260).  He became a Ferranti non-executive 
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101 TNA, PREM19/260, Thatcher letter to Basil de Ferranti, June 24, 1980. 
102 TNA, FV94/218, letter, June 14, 1980. 
103 TNA, FV94/219, letter, June 16, 1980. 
104 TNA, PREM19/260, letter from Councillor J.C. Campbell, June 6, 1980. 
105 Ibid., an undated list “provided by the Chief Whip” names these Conservatives. 
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constituents and union representatives.106  The debate ended with a vote in which a 
large majority supported the sale “as soon as practicable, having regard to the interests 
of the company, the taxpayer and other such considerations as the Government may 
draw to the [NEB’s] attention”.107 Joseph and Butler met separate delegations of 
Conservative and Labour members before this debate and union representatives 
afterwards, and NEB chairman Knight also met union representatives and Labour 
members after the debate.108 
 
Scottish Secretary and Cabinet minister George Younger noted that Ferranti had 7,300 
employees in Scotland, many in “high quality” jobs, and that Scotland accounted for 
30, 40 and 50 percent of the group’s assets, employment and profits, respectively.  He 
argued against selling to the highest bidder: “It is no part of our industrial policy to 
further the extinction of independent companies with records of technological 
success”, and that such a disposal “would run counter … to our defence, industrial, 
competition and regional policies”, provoke unnecessary conflict with the Ferranti 
management and workforce, and further alienate Scottish business and public opinion, 
already bruised by deindustrialization and recession.109  The best option would be “to 
look for the best price on a widely dispersed placing of the [NEB’s] shareholding, on 
the basis of a solution which takes proper account of the Scottish interest in a 
company so important to the economy of Scotland”.110  He also claimed that Scottish 
financial institutions had indicated to the NEB their willingness to support such a 
solution. 
 
The political pressure in Scotland was evidenced in several ways. In an election for 
the vacant Glasgow Central seat on June 26, 1980 the Conservative share of the vote 
                                                          
106 Hansard House of Commons, June 18, 1980, cols. 1589-1648. 
107 Ibid., col. 1648. 
108 TNA, FV94/219, minutes of meetings involving Joseph and Butler on June 17, 18 
and 24, 1980, and Knight on June 24 and 26, 1980. For voluminous correspondence 
between numerous members of parliament and Butler, Joseph and Thatcher see 
FV94/218 and /219. 
109 TNA, PREM19/260, Younger letter to Joseph, June 12, 1980. 
110 Ibid.   
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fell to 8.8 percent from 16.4 percent at the 1979 election.111  An open letter to 
Thatcher in a popular Scottish newspaper on the day before this election attacked a 
possible sale to the highest bidder.112  Michael Ancram, Conservative House of 
Commons member for Edinburgh South, warned that “the political ramifications 
would be great in Scotland” if the disposal resulted in job losses in Ferranti’s Scottish 
business.113  Scottish church leaders feared “the gradual extinction of the flame of 
local enterprise and leadership”.114  Scottish sentiments were driven by concern that 
GEC would gain control of Ferranti and rationalize its Scottish business.115 
 
Joseph professed sympathy for the position of Ferranti and its employees, but 
continued to favor seeking the highest bid.  He suggested that wide dispersal, 
necessarily at a discount to the market price, and at an even greater discount to what a 
single bidder would pay, would reduce the sale proceeds but fail to guarantee 
independence.116  However, in the House of Commons debate he limited potential 
bidders to domestic ones, confirming that “the Government are not prepared to 
contemplate [Ferranti] passing into foreign ownership”.117 
 
                                                          
111 Cook and Ramsden, By-elections in British Politics, 295. 
112 Daily Express, “Dear Maggie: Scots See Ferranti as a Test of Your Intentions”, 
Scottish edition, June 25, 1980. 
113 Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, THCR 2/6/2/93 pt 2 (44), “Memorandum 
on Political Implications of Ferranti Decision”, June 18, 1980, available at 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/119339. 
114  The Times, letter from W.B. Johnston and Iain O. MacDonald, “Disposal of 
State’s Ferranti Holding”, June 23, 1980. See also TNA, FV94/218 for note on the 
“The Future of Ferranti Ltd” by the Church of Scotland Home Board’s “Society, 
Religion & Technology Project”. 
115 Rival takeover bids by HSBC and Standard Chartered for the Royal Bank of 
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Wakes, 69, 73–76, 79–80). 
116 TNA, PREM19/260, Joseph note to Thatcher, June 16, 1980. 
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Other ministers pressed Joseph.  John Nott, Secretary of State for Trade, indicated his 
unwillingness to “destroy the credibility of our competition policy” by over-ruling any 
recommendation to refer a bid for Ferranti to the competition authorities. He noted 
that any such reference would raise considerable uncertainty and prolong the disposal 
process.118  Prior asked to be consulted before a final decision.119  Some ministers 
suggested higher procurement costs for the MoD, Ferranti’s largest customer, could 
offset the financial gain from sale to the highest bidder.120 
 
Joseph chaired the Sub-Committee’s meeting in which “a small but clear majority” 
supported Younger’s proposal for wide dispersal of the NEB stake, subject to suitable 
conditions preventing onward sales to a single buyer such as GEC.121  The meeting 
noted that employee involvement would reduce the shares available to a potential 
bidder, and considered the desirability but unlikelihood of the involvement of major 
British banks as long-term shareholders.122  Thatcher accepted the Sub-Committee’s 
recommendation, which Joseph reported could yield proceeds at least £10-20 million 
lower than sale to the highest bidder.123 
                                                          
118 TNA, PREM19/260, Nott letter to Joseph, June 23, 1980.  London Stock Exchange 
rules obliged an investor who acquired at least 30 percent of the shares of a listed 
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119 Ibid., Prior letter to Joseph, June 24, 1980. 
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On July 1, 1980 Joseph announced to the House of Commons that the NEB stake 
would be placed with institutional shareholders.  There would be a two-year lock-in to 
prevent disposals, with acquirers barred from voting on control issues during this 
period, and four percent of the NEB’s stake (i.e. two percent of the total equity) would 
be retained for an employee trust.124  The announcement was timed to eliminate any 
uncertainty ahead of the Queen’s visit to Ferranti’s Edinburgh factories on the 
following day. The outcome was a total victory for the Ferranti board’s aggressive 
lobbying for such a solution across political and other networks. 
 
The placing operation was successful but proved more difficult than expected, as 
some institutional investors had hoped for a substantial discount in exchange for the 
two-year lock-in period and voting restrictions.125  The NEB’s stake was placed at 
£5.30 per share, an 11 percent discount to the £5.97 market price at which trading had 
been suspended on June 30, 1980 ahead of Joseph’s announcement.  Trading 
reopened on July 2, 1980, with a closing price of £5.72, an eight percent premium to 
the placement price and a four percent discount to the pre-announcement price. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this section we reflect on the disposal of the NEB’s stake in Ferranti and its wider 
relevance to privatization. The disposal was very deliberately intended to reconcile 
                                                          
Henderson of Kleinwort Benson, also a Deputy Chairman of the Stock Exchange, 
June 17, 1980). 
124 Hansard House of Commons, July 1, 1980, cols. 1305–1306. 
125 The Times, “Buyers Slow to Take Up Ferranti Shares Offer”, July 2, 1980, 19; 
“Institutions Rally Round to Take Up Ferranti Shares”, July 3, 1980, 19. Economist, 
“The Scots Get Their Way”, July 5, 1980, 86–87.  Scottish institutions had indicated 
to the NEB that they sought a 20 to 30 percent discount to the market price in 
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the interests of various stakeholder groups.  Sale to a single bidder, domestic or 
foreign, could have realized significantly higher proceeds, but at the price of 
antagonizing management and employees, and with the potential for higher 
procurement costs and serious political damage.  The placing terms realized 
significant proceeds and limited opportunities for subsequent takeover.  The disposal 
secured the company’s independence from government and lifted the immediate 
threat to thousands of jobs, many in politically-sensitive areas such as Greater 
Manchester and Scotland with marginal parliamentary seats at risk.  The government 
could claim that it had responded to concerns over the sale, had not sold the shares 
“too cheaply”, and had preserved competition in defense procurement.  The shadow 
of GEC, which heavily influenced the behavior of Ferranti, the government and the 
NEB, was dodged for the moment.  However, the fragmentation of the NEB’s stake 
left no significant large shareholders who would have been in a position to monitor 
Ferranti’s corporate governance. This contributed to the outcome that so many had 
sought to avoid when GEC bought most of Ferranti’s activities after its disastrous 
1987 merger with the US company International Signal and Control.126   
 
The literature does not treat Ferranti as a mainstream privatization like those of the 
major state corporations such as British Aerospace, British Airways, British Steel, 
British Telecom, and the utility companies.  Parker’s two-volume official history of 
privatization, written with full access to all government documents, has little to say on 
the NEB or the disposals of its interests other than BL and Rolls-Royce; Ferranti does 
not even have an index entry.127  We argue, nevertheless, that the case provided 
important early experience in the Thatcherite privatization program. 
 
After leaving office Thatcher commented in her memoirs that: 
 
… in some cases it was a choice between having the ideal circumstances for 
privatization, which might take years to achieve, and going for a sale within a 
particular politically determined timescale, [and] the second was a preferable 
                                                          
126 Billings, Tilba and Wilson, “To Invite Disappointment or Worse”. 
127 Parker, Formative Years.  Similarly, Hoskyns’ memoir refers neither to Ferranti 
nor the NEB (Hoskyns, Just in Time). 
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option [as] state-owned businesses can never function as proper businesses …  
Our privatization programme was constantly breaking new ground.  Each 
industry posed its own special problems.  Each flotation or trade sale raised 
separate issues.128 
 
This statement can be interpreted as a principled determination to pursue privatization 
with close attention to the particular circumstances of individual companies, or an ex-
post rationalization of the ad-hoc implementation of a policy lacking a fixed plan.  
Her comments are consistent with both the views on the coherence of privatization 
policy discussed earlier, and the pragmatic approach adopted in the Ferranti case, 
which reflected her government’s early caution in some areas.  This contrasts with 
notable radicalism in other aspects of Conservative policy, for example, reform of 
trade union legislation, monetarist macroeconomic policy, and the abolition of foreign 
exchange controls.129   
 
There were several reasons for this early cautiousness, which helped to establish the 
privatization program’s political acceptability and credibility.  First was the question 
of priorities. Parker argues that the first two years of the 1979-83 Conservative 
government were characterized by a struggle to find saleable assets to reduce 
borrowing as the economy slid into deep recession.130  From within government 
Hoskyns viewed the initial priority as stabilization of its finances and downplayed 
privatization’s early significance.131  Lawson, however, claims that “privatization was 
a central plank of our policy right from the start”, but that “little detailed work had 
been done on the subject in Opposition”.132  A second reason was that privatization’s 
                                                          
128 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, 677, 678. 
129 Bellringer and Michie, “Big Bang”; Helm, “Economic Borders of the State”; 
Mayer, “Big Bang”. 
130 Parker, Formative Years, 52–77; see also Stevens, “Evolution of Privatisation”, 
55–56. 
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of Privatisation”) cautions several times. The 1979 Conservative manifesto made 
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public appeal was unclear, and the limited 1979 manifesto promises reflected 
“Margaret’s understandable fear of frightening the floating voter”, with uncertainty as 
to whether voter antipathy towards the nationalized industries would translate into an 
appetite for privatization.133  Thatcher’s fear was rational as “public opinion was 
invariably hostile” to every major privatization, although once executed “the private 
sector status of the industry concerned became accepted as a fact of life”.134 Surveys 
on voter attitudes, however, showed that support for denationalization in 1979 had 
almost doubled to 40 per cent from the previous October 1974 election.135 Finally, the 
government’s own banking advisers, other City bankers, the Bank of England and 
industrialists expressed persistent doubts about the ability of the financial markets to 
absorb privatization sales.136 
 
The Ferranti disposal, with the company’s shares already listed on the stock exchange, 
showed that the existence of a market price could be used to measure disposal options 
and investor appetite.  Some later privatizations adopted the model of selling shares in 
tranches, allowing for the establishment of a market (see Table 1).  This should have 
secured greater proceeds than one-stage disposals, although a recurring criticism was 
that particular companies were privatized “too cheaply” for political reasons and to 
secure success of the sales.137 
                                                          
explicit reference only to sales of the National Freight Corporation, and the 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, argued in 1982 that maximization 
of sale proceeds should be the dominant consideration in privatizations, rather than 
ensuring “a wide spread of holdings”.138  The Ferranti case contradicted this, and 
“special problems” led the government to accept lower disposal proceeds than could 
have been achieved by sale to a single industrial buyer.  The direct placement of 
shares with institutional investors also differed from the disposal methods most 
commonly used in later privatizations, typically public share offerings, usually by 
fixed price offer, sometimes by tender.139  However, the aims of maximizing proceeds 
and wide distribution were not necessarily in conflict. The size of the companies 
involved made aggressive public marketing campaigns and wide distribution 
inevitable in most of the later privatizations.140  The two-year ownership “lock-in” at 
Ferranti reflected the desire to protect the company’s post-privatization independence.  
Later privatizations used alternative methods to address similar concerns, as Table 1 
summarizes.  These included the retention of minority interests until companies were 
established in the private sector, limits on the percentage of shares that any individual 
and/or foreign owners could hold, restrictions on the appointment of non-British 
directors, and the issue to the government of special preference, or “golden”, shares 
which conferred special rights, typically allowing the government to block changes of 
control or amendments to company constitutions as reflected in their articles of 
association.141  We found no evidence that the possible use of such methods was 
discussed in the Ferranti case. 
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139 Veljanovski, Selling the State, 93–94.  Parker (Formative Years; Popular 
Capitalism) addresses the detailed mechanics of individual privatizations. 
140 Although institutional investors were the dominant buyers, frustrating the more 
commited advocates of personal equity ownership (Edwards, “Manufacturing 
Capitalists”). 
141 See Parker, Formative Years, 426–430; and Popular Capitalism, 346–347, 511–
512.  The origins of the “golden” share concept are not entirely clear. Lawson claims 
to have originated it and implies that it was first used in the Britoil privatization after 
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Notwithstanding Conservative rhetoric on the benefits of wider employee share 
ownership, the Ferranti disposal came too early to be representative of the Thatcherite 
ideological drive to a property-owning democracy which in part motivated later 
privatizations.  Measures to encourage employee share ownership became a standard 
feature, partly to disarm union opposition.142 Incentives were almost invariably more 
generous than at Ferranti, where the two percent stake made available to employees 
was small, and employees were reluctant to back the company in this way, despite 
their appeals that the NEB should retain its stake and their commitment to the 
company’s turnaround and belief in its prospects.143  Similarly, none of Ferranti’s 
directors increased their shareholdings after the disposal, and a management buy-out 
does not appear to have been contemplated during the sale process.144 
 
The desire to preserve competition and the capacity for innovation in defense 
procurement and uphold competition policy featured prominently in the arguments of 
ministers who supported wide dispersal of the NEB’s stake in Ferranti.  But the case 
                                                          
he became Secretary of State for Energy (Lawson, View from No. 11, 219). Parker 
(Formative Years, 137–138) locates its first use in the earlier Amersham International 
privatization in which Lawson was involved as Financial Secretary to the Treasury. 
But the initial sales of British Aerospace and Cable and Wireless, which preceded the 
Amersham International sale, both included “golden” shares. 
142 Parker, Formative Years, 161. 
143 The NEB’s remaining two percent holding yielded a £1 million profit in 1981 
(NEB, Annual Report, 1981, 22).  18.4 percent of Ferranti employees took up only 
62.7 percent of the shares reserved for them through a scheme which offered “one free 
stock unit for every one bought at the offer price of 500p” (Ferranti, Annual Report, 
1981, 7, 27; quote from 7 and authors’ calculation).  In later privatizations 
participation rates ranged from 19 percent at Jaguar in 1984 (in which no employee 
inducements were offered) to 99 percent at Amersham International, Cable and 
Wireless and British Gas (Parker, Formative Years, 436, Table 16.7). 
144 At March 31, 1980 directors other than the Ferranti brothers held only 0.37 percent 
of the company’s issued shares, and did not increase their holdings in later years 
(Billings, Tilba and Wilson, “To Invite Disappointment or Worse”, 461, Table 1). 
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did not raise the competition and regulatory issues which represented considerable 
obstacles in later privatizations of natural or regulated monopolies such as British 
Telecom, the rail industry, and the electricity, gas and water utilities.145  These 
required new regulatory structures with industry-specific regulators established pre-
privatization, an issue which the 1983 Conservative manifesto recognized.146 The 
Ferranti case also represented a rejection of the “national champion” concept, the 
creation of a company with the scale and scope to dominate domestically and compete 
internationally, an argument GEC used to support its potential takeover of Ferranti.  In 
this and other respects the Ferranti disposal shared another important feature much 
discussed in relation to later privatizations: the need to secure the support of 
incumbent management.147 
 
From a political perspective the Ferranti disposal could be seen as a defeat for 
privatization “evangelists” such as Joseph, Lawson, Butler, and Redwood.  In some 
respects, the disposal should have been relatively straightforward, but pragmatic 
considerations forced compromises. On the other hand, if Ferranti, and other early 
privatizations, reflected the need for cash as much as a fully coherent agenda, the 
limited 1979 manifesto commitments were delivered to begin the privatization 
program.  Many of the issues in the Ferranti case – balancing pricing against other 
considerations, competition, protecting the “national interest”, securing employee and 
management support, ensuring sufficient demand for the sale – would recur in later 
                                                          
145 Much of the economics literature on privatization has focused on the relationship 
between ownership, competition and regulation (for example, Helm, “Economic 
Borders of the State”, Kay and Thompson, “Privatisation” and Vickers and Yarrow, 
“Economic Perspectives”).  Lawson (View from No. 11, 239–240) argued that debates 
around competition could begin only after decisions to privatize had been made – 
until this point SOEs were not subject to financial disciplines which could deliver 
structural change. 
146 Dale, Conservative Party Manifestos, 291–292; Parker, Formative Years, 438–440; 
Veljanovski, Selling the State, 165–186. 
147 Veljanovski, Selling the State, 118–119. Chick (“Triumph of Past Practice”) argues 
that this factor had previously dominated relations between government and SOEs in 
Britain. 
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privatizations. The 1983 Conservative election manifesto referred to full or partial 
sales of a range of SOEs.148  By then privatization was seen as a means of promoting 
wider share ownership as part of a “property- [or capital-] owning democracy”, 
emboldened by and extending beyond the success of the popular “right to buy” for 
tenants in municipal housing, and offering a means of funding cuts in personal 
taxation.149   
 
This paper addresses several issues which have recently re-entered British political 
debate over the relationship between the state and business.  The 2013 part-disposal of 
the state-owned Royal Mail Group revived familiar controversies around the under-
pricing of privatized assets.150  Actual and prospective sales of government holdings 
in Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland acquired through financial 
crisis “bail-outs”, and Lloyds’ disposal of part of its business in the form of TSB, have 
also contributed to a renewal of interest in privatization.  Jeremy Corbyn’s 2015 
election as Labour Party leader opened the possibility of renationalization of some 
privatized industries: energy and water utilities, the Royal Mail and railways.151  
Discussions around the need to maintain a domestic steel industry provoked debate 
around the necessity and most effective means of undertaking state “bail-outs”.152  We 
expect future governments in Britain and elsewhere to face very similar problems to 
those which Ferranti, the NEB, and the privatization program more generally posed. 
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Table 1 Features of major privatizations 
Company Initial sale Term of special 
rights or “golden” 
share 
Limits on Restrictions on 
appointment of 
directors 
Percentage of 
shares sold 
Date individual 
holdings 
aggregate foreign 
holdings 
Amersham 
International 
100 February 1982 fixed period  15 percent    
Associated British 
Ports 
51.5 February 1983     
British Aerospace 51.6 February 1981 no time limit  15 percent  
British Airways 100 February 1987  15 percent 25 percent  
British Gas 100 December 1986 no time limit 15 percent   
British Telecom 50.2 December 1984 no time limit, 
with right to 
appoint two 
directors 
15 percent  chief executive to be 
UK citizen 
Britoil 51 November 1982 no time limit temporary majority to special rights 
share if voting rights held by one person 
exceed 25 percent 
 
Cable and 
Wireless 
49 November 1981 no time limit 15 percent  chief executive to be 
UK citizen 
Enterprise Oil 100 July 1984 fixed period temporary majority to special rights 
share if voting rights held by one person 
exceed 50 percent 
 
Jaguar 100 April 1984 fixed period 15 percent   
Rolls-Royce 100 May 1987 no time limit in 
respect of voting 
on restrictions on 
foreign ownership 
15 percent on 
holdings other 
than foreign 
holdings 
15 percent at least 75 percent of 
directors, including 
chairman and 
managing director, to 
be UK citizens 
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Source: Parker, Formative Years, 180–181, 200, 261, 428. 
 
Note: this table includes only those companies sold by (tender or fixed price) public offer during the first ten years of the Conservative 
government. 
 
